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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

:
:

v.

:

KATHLEEN MARIA NIEBERGER,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

Case No. 20040907-CA

:

INTRODUCTION
This case is before the Court for interlocutory review of two issues: (1)
whether the child endangerment statute, Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-112.5 (2003), is
unconstitutionally vague in violation of due process as applied to Ms. Nieberger;
and (2) whether the district court erred in refusing to quash the bindover of
Ms. Nieberger on two counts of child endangerment.
The child endangerment statute is void for vagueness because (1) it fails to
give notice that keeping marijuana and paraphernalia in out of reach places in the
home would subject Ms. Nieberger to child endangerment charges for "exposing"
her children to the marijuana and paraphernalia; and (2) it fails to provide minimal
guidelines for enforcement, thereby allowing for arbitrary and discriminatory
enforcement. The term "expose to" is so broad that it fails to define circumstances
under which it applies; in particular, it fails to clarify that having marijuana and
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paraphernalia in a house where children reside would give rise to prosecution for
child endangerment. The breadth of this term and the failure to require danger or a
significant risk of harm result in a vague statute with unclear application.
In addition, the trial court's order should be reversed not only because the
statute is void for vagueness, but also because the state failed to establish probable
cause to believe that Ms. Nieberger's children were "exposed" to marijuana and
paraphernalia. Since the marijuana and paraphernalia were out of reach and there
was no evidence that the children had access to the items, the state failed to
establish probable cause to believe the children were "exposed" to the marijuana
and paraphernalia.
ARGUMENT
POINT I. THE CHILD ENDANGERMENT STATUTE IS
UNCONSTITUTIONALLY VAGUE.
In this interlocutory appeal, Ms. Nieberger challenges the child
endangerment statute as applied to her because the statute fails to give notice that
having marijuana and paraphernalia in her house but out of reach where the
contraband did not pose a significant risk of harm could give rise to child
endangerment charges and also because the statute allows for arbitrary
enforcement. The language of the statute, including the words "exposed to" fails
to adequately define the circumstances under which the statute gives rise to
criminal charges and allows officers, prosecutors and judges to decide whether, in
their opinion, a child is "exposed to" drugs in circumstances such as these where
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marijuana is in the vicinity of the children but out of reach and there is no
evidence that the children actually saw, touched, were aware of, ingested, or were
otherwise "exposed to" the substances.
A facial challenge on vagueness grounds will be upheld "'only if the
[statute] is vague in all of its applications (citation omitted).'" State v. MacGuire,
2004 UT 4, f 12, 84 P.3d 1171. When a statute is not vague in all of its
applications, it nevertheless is unconstitutional in violation of due process if it is
vague in its application to the defendant. Id. In other words, when the statute is
used to prosecute a defendant in a context where the statute does not give notice
and/or allows for arbitrary enforcement, the defendant can challenge the statute.
See generally State v. Green, 2004 UT 76, f!5 n. 15, 99 P.3d 820 (indicating that
courts examine a statute in light of defendant's conduct unless a statute is vague in
all of its applications). In this case where there is no evidence that the children
were even aware of the marijuana and paraphernalia let alone endangered by them
or placed at risk because of them but the state nevertheless maintains that the
children were "exposed to" the substances, the child endangerment statute is
unconstitutionally vague.
Although in some circumstances a word in a statute can be subject to
multiple meanings and still pass constitutional muster, in this case, the words
"exposed to" when read in conjunction with the remainder of the statute are so
undefined that it is unclear whether the statute applies in circumstances such as the
instant one. The state and the trial judge adopt a broad meaning which defines
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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"expose to" as u to lay open" and which also includes making things "visible" and
leaving them in plain view. According to the state and the prosecutor, then, any
time paraphernalia is visible to a child, a parent can be subjected to child
endangerment charges. This interpretation of the word "exposed to" is so broad
that virtually any action by parents that allows their children to be in the vicinity
of controlled substances or paraphernalia would give rise to charges regardless of
whether the activity creates any type of risk.
The definition of the words "exposed to" offered by the state includes,
however, an element of risk. See state's brief at 13. According to that definition,
the word "expose" is defined not only as "to lay open" but more importantly "to
lay open (as to attack, danger, trial and test): make accessible to something that
may prove detrimental . . . ." State's brief at 13 (quoting Webster's Third New
International Dictionary 802 (1993)) (emphasis added). In other words, the
definition suggested by the state requires some sort of accessibility and some sort
of danger for there to be exposure. Although being visible or in plain view does
not incorporate this requirement of danger or accessibility, the state and trial court
nevertheless insist that a child is "exposed to" marijuana and paraphernalia if such
items are visible, regardless of whether they pose any danger to the child. This
application of the child endangerment statute highlights the vagueness of its
language.
Additionally, as pointed out in Appellant's opening brief at 23-24, the
statute requires that a child be exposed to the contraband and not that the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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contraband be exposed to the child. By interpreting the statute to include
circumstances where contraband is in plain view, visible or laid open to children,
the state and the trial judge turn the language of the statute around, arguing that the
statute also applies when controlled substances or paraphernalia are visible or laid
open to the child. This interpretation misreads the plain language of the statute
which requires not that the controlled substance be exposed, but that the child be
exposed to the contraband.
The state seems to suggest that the child endangerment statute has an even
broader application because any parent who uses illegal substances "exposes" his
or her child to a risk of harm. State's brief at 23-24. Rather than supporting the
state's argument that the words "exposed to" are sufficiently precise to pass
constitutional muster, the state's discussion on pages 23-24 of its brief emphasizes
the undefined and vague potential reach of the child endangerment statute. Taken
to an extreme, the state's argument suggests that all parents who have used
controlled substances could be charged with child endangerment simply because
the children are at greater risk than their counterparts whose parents have not used
drugs. Such an expansive reading of the child endangerment statute impinges on
the two touchstones of the due process vagueness protection by failing to give
notice and at the same time giving rise to arbitrary enforcement.
POINT II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE
MOTION TO QUASH THE BINDOVER.
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As set forth in Appellant's opening brief, the state failed to introduce
sufficient evidence at the preliminary hearing to establish probable cause to
believe that the children were exposed to marijuana and drug paraphernalia found
in the house. The fact that the items may have been visible or in plain view to
adults does not establish that the children were exposed to them. In fact, there is
no evidence that the children saw, were aware of the items or were impacted in
any way by the contraband. Under these circumstances, the bindover should be
quashed.
CONCLUSION
Defendant/Appellant Kathleen Nieberger, by and through counsel, Joan C.
Watt and Shannon N. Romero, respectfully requests that this Court hold that the
child endangerment statute violates due process or, in the alternative, reverse the
denial of Appellant's motion to quash the two child endangerment counts.
SUBMITTED this /<?<* day of August, 2005.

V£C* <? c<Jk^Y
JOAN C. WATT
SHANNON N. ROMERO
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant
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